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Integration in the Alliance/Integrated Military Services-Really the Trademark of the Bundeswehr?
Few other NATO armed forces in the Cold War were as strongly committed to the concept of integration, as was the Bundeswehr. Indeed, the creation of new West German armed forces was made possible only under the condition that they be, from the very fi rst, fully integrated into the Western alliance. 1 Accordingly, the Bundeswehr's military organization, as well as the mindset of its military commanders, should have evolved into a mirror image of NATO's strategy.
It is important to note that in the very beginning of the discussion about a West German military contribution, its prospective founders laid out the integration principle in its founding document. Th e principle was established that the rebirth of a new German "Wehrmacht" (a term which at that time referred to "armed forces" in general) could only be accomplished if carried out as a contingent force of the European/Atlantic defense eff ort. Bundeswehr (1974), 3, 18-21; Weißbuch 1975 /76. Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr (1976 Weißbuch 1983 . Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1983 Weißbuch 1985 . Zur Lage und Entwicklung der Bundeswehr (1985 , 99f., 112-15.
5 HDV 100/1 (above, note 3), 14.
6 Th e later General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, Ulrich de Maizière (1966-72) was also a member of "Amt Blank" from 1952. See Ulrich de Maizière, Was war neu Himmerod Conference in October 1950, was repeated in the primary manuals and regulations of the Bundeswehr in following years. Twelve years aft er Himmerod, the Bundeswehr army's command doctrine would declare, "Only with the unifi ed force of all the NATO states can a defense be successful. " 3 Th is principle was applied in general. It was maintained up to the end of the Cold War as Bundeswehr offi cial policy, for instance in the Bundeswehr's "White Books" that were regularly published and which provided guidance concerning national policy and the mission and structure of the Bundeswehr. 4 Another theme along these lines was also repeated from the very beginning: "A meaningful cooperation of all branches of the armed forces is required for success in waging war. No single branch of the armed forces can, by itself, win victory. "
5 But how compatible was this principle of joint forces' integration with the other one of close integration into the alliance?
All this thinking about the new army stood in clear contradiction to the Wehrmacht's actual experience of past warfare. Yet these ideas were, ironically, put into place by former Wehrmacht offi cers-though, of course, it could have hardly been otherwise. Indeed, the spirit of the Himmerod Conference served to turn around some of the most noteworthy tendencies of the Prussian/German military traditions of the last two centuries. Th e concept of isolating the military aspects of war from national policy as well as from the broader society-and the isolation of the branches of the military from each other-was something that the Bundeswehr intended to push into the past. According to Ulrich de Maizière, one of the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr and its later military chief, the new ideal for the new army would be for each part to understand the vision and purpose of the whole. 6 He set
